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CmnmNAL LAW-NARCOTICS-CONSTU~ rIVE POssEsSION: CONVIc-
TION REvE1sED WHE[E No PosiTIvE SHOWING OF DoliNION AND
CONTROL OVER DRUGS OR PImMisEs.-State v. Callahan, 77 Wash.
Dec. 2d 26,459 P.2d 400 (1969).
Defendant Hutchinson was arrested after Seattle police discovered
narcotics during a search of a houseboat on which he had been a visitor
during the previous two days. The only personal effects of the defen-
dant which were found on the houseboat were two books on drugs, a
set of broken scales, and two guns. There was no evidence offered to
substantiate a claim that the defendant resided on the houseboat, or
that he contributed significantly to its maintenance.
No narcotics were found on the defendant's person, although various
narcotics were discovered within the defendant's reach on and under-
neath a desk which he shared with a co-defendant. There were at
least three other people in close proximity to the drugs. Although he
admitted that he had inspected and handled the drugs earlier in the
day, defendant made no claim of ownership, and a co-defendant testi-
fied that the drugs belonged to him. In reviewing the defendant's ap-
peal from a conviction of possession of narcotics under the Uniform
Narcotic Drug Act,' the Washington Supreme Court keld: insufficient
evidence existed for the jury to find that the defendant had dominion
and control, a necessary element of constructive possession, of either
the contraband narcotics or the premises on which the narcotics were
found. State v. Callalan, 77 Wash. Dec. 2d 26, 459 P.2d 400 (1969).
In order to obtain a conviction for possession of narcotics, the state
must show that the defendant either had actual, personal custody of
the drugs,2 or that he "constructively" possessed them.8 To prove
constructive possession, it must be shown that the defendant exerted
1. WAsH. REv. CoDe § 69.33.230 (1959). It provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, possess, have under his control,
sell, prescribe, administer, dispense, or compound any narcotic drug, except as autho-
rized in this chapter.
This statute superseded ch. 47, § 3 [1923] Wash. Sess. Laws, making it unlawful to have
possession with intent to sell. The Washington court, in reversing a conviction under the
old act stated:
We conclude, therefore, that the mere possession of narcotics, unaccompanied by any
intent to sell, furnish, or dispose of the same ... is not a criminal offense ....
State v. Lee, 127 Wash. 377, 380, 220 P. 753, 754 (1923).
2. Callahan, 77 Wash. Dec. 2d at 28, '459 P.2d at 401 (1969).
3. Id.at28,459P.2dat402.
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dominion and control over the drugs. 4 Once the state has shown either
actual or constructive possession, the burden then shifts to the defen-
dant to rebut a presumption that he knew he possessed the drugs;- he
can defend by proving that his possession was "unwitting, lawful, or
otherwise excusable."' Requiring the defendant to rebut the presump-
tion that his possession was inexcusable has been held not to deny him
due process of law.'
4. The Washington court first applied the dominion and control test in State v.
Walcott, 72 Wn. 2d 959, 968, 435 P.2d 994, 1000 (1967). For examples of unsophisticated
application of the dominion and control tests in the federal courts, see Rodella v. United
States, 286 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 889 (1961) and Quiles v. United
States, 344 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1965). See also Garza v. United States, 385 F.2d 899 (5th
Cir. 1967) ; 31 FoRD. L. REv. 821 (1963).
5. The defendant's knowledge of his possession of the narcotics is presumed once
possession is proved. See note 7, in/ra. In State v. Hall, 41 Wn. 2d 446, 249 P.2d 769
(1952), the defendant was trying to show that the mens rea element could be rebutted by
his claimed ignorance. The court, although disbelieving him, nevertheless acknowledged
the arguability of his position. Nowhere does possession of narcotics exist as a strict lia-
bility offense. Cf. State v. Boggs, 57 Wn. 2d 484, 358 P.2d 124 (1961). Therein the court
explicitly stated that knowledge of the narcotic character of the article possessed was not
required. For a pointed examination of the federal treatment of the knowledge-presump-
tion issue see Sandier, The Statutory Presumption in Federal Narcotics Prosecutions, 57
J. Can. L.C. & P.S. 7, 10 nn.49-51 (1966).
6. Callahan, 77 Wash. Dec. 2d at 30-31, 459 P.2d at 403.
7. Recent scholarship has dealt with the questionable constitutionality of state and
federal statutes which place a responsibility upon a possessor of narcotics to rebut the
presumption that the possession was illegal. It is now established that the prosecution must
show the rationality of a presumption before a defendant can be required to go forward
with rebutting evidence. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 45 (1969) ; Turner v. United
States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970). The presumed fact, "more likely than not," must flow from
the proven fact. Leary, supra, at 36; accord, United States v. Adams, 293 F. Supp. 776
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). See 34 ALBANY L. REv. 684, 687 (1970). See also 7 HousTor L. Rv.
(1970).
The holding in Leary, supra, constricted a long-standing doctrine which required only
a "rational connection" between the presumed and proven elements in a criminal offense.
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1943). See 56 Haav. L. REV. 1324 (1943). For
a discussion of the hypothesis that the courts never bothered with the Tot requirement,
and instead relied upon common sense tests of connection between proven and presumed
facts see Comment, Constitutionality of Rebuttable Statutory Presumptions, 55 CoLum.
L. R V. 527, 541-47 (1955); and Comment, Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Judicial
Sleight of Hand, 53 VA. L. REv. 702 (1967). Compare Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88
(1928), with Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934). Ferry and Morrison uphold
federal statutory presumptions in civil and criminal actions respectively. See generally
Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law upon the Burden of Proof, 68
U. PA. L. Rav. 307 (1920); Brosman, The Statutory Presumption, 5 Tot. L. Rav. 17
(1930).
The question arises, therefore, whether illegality is an inferential offshoot of possession
under the Uniform Narcotic Drug Law. WAsH. REv. CODE § 69.33.390 (1959) provides:
In any complaint, information or indictment, and in any action or proceeding
brought for the enforcement of any provision of this chapter, it shall not be necessary
to negative any exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption contained in this chapter,
and the burden of proof of any exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption shall be on
the defendant.
This section squarely puts the burden on the defendant to show that the possession was
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Constructive possession is a very old concept,8 having its origins in
explanations of absentee-ownership of real and personal property
Within the realm of criminal possession, courts have utilized the notion
of "constructive" possession in response to public pressure for more
vigorous law enforcement directed against possessors of forbidden
chattels.10 Possession of liquor,11 burglar's tools,1 2 or narcotics' 3 need
only be constructive in order to raise a presumption of illegality.14
The Washington court applied the definitions of constructive posses-
sion developed in the contraband liquor cases to the first narcotics
cases. The test as adopted placed no emphasis on dominion and control
not illegal. No indication has yet been made by the Washington court that the pre-
sumption in question violates established constitutional standards of due process. See, e.g.,
State v. Morris, 70 Wn. 2d 27, 422 P.2d 27 (1966); cf. State v. Garcia, 69 Wn. 2d 546,
419 P.2d 121 (1966). However, Washington's unequivocal pronouncements on the issue all
antedated the holding in Leary, supra. The suggestion has been made that the next logical
test will be that the statutory presumption will be allowed only where there is "no
reasonable doubt" that the presumed fact follows from the proved fact. See 34 ALBANY L.
REv. 684 (1970). It seems persuasive that there could be a reasonable doubt that de-
fendants illegally possess narcotics. A person who had dominion and control over the
premises where drugs were found might not know that the narcotics were there. Why
should the state not be required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the person
was cognizant of the presence of the drugs?
8. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 129 Wash. 62, 224 P. 602 (1924); cf. Webb v. State, 38
Tex. Crim. 620, 44 S.W. 498 (1898).
9. To illustrate:
A dies, never having been in actual physical possession of a certain piece of land,
but having therein complete property. B, A's heir, is unaware of both A's ownership
and A's death and is not in physical occupation of the land. B has constructive
possession of the land.
RESTATENMNT OE PROPERTY § 7, illustration 5 at 21 (1936).
10. Federal and state courts have both recognized a necessity to resurrect legal
fictions when policy dictates a need for stricter application and broader definition of
criminal sanctions. See generally Comment, Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Judicial
Sleight of Hand, 53 VA. L. REv. 702 (1967). The prefix "constructive" has been called
"the mere trademark of a fiction." Schoedel v. State Bank, 254 Wis. 74, 75, 13 N.W.2d
534, 535 (1944). Elements of crimes were originally established with "actual," and not
"constructive" hypothetical situations as references. Hodges v. Eddy, 38 Vt. (12 Veazey)
327 (1865).
When dealing with a criminal violation, proof of which is based on a circumstantially-
inferred element, utmost attention must be given in consistently and fairly weighing that
element. Due process considerations, the mandate of stare decisis, and the tendency for
individuals arbitrarily to apply indefinite guidelines require circumspection when applying
the prefix "constructive." Policy, therefore, must be quite strong to allow the state, by
means of the adjudicative instead of the legislative process, to establish easier standards of
proof. See note 7, supra.
11. State v. Johnson, 129 Wash, 62, 224 P. 602 (1924).
12. State v. McDonald, 74 Wn. 2d 474, 445 P.2d 345 (1968).
13. Compare State v. Callahan, 77 Wash. Dec. 2d 26, 459 P.2d 400 (1969), with State
v. Henker, 50 Wn. 2d 809, 314 P.2d 645 (1957).
14. See note 7, supra.
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and it was unclear what would inculpate a defendant arrested for his
knowing proximity to narcotics.'"
Elemental in these pre-dominion and control definitions of construc-
tive possession were requirements resurrected from the prohibition era
such as "legal title or ownership of the thing and the right to immediate
actual possession."'"
Recently, however, the Washington court has borrowed the dominion
and control test from federal jurisdictions'7 and has attempted to
delineate two distinct fact situations, either of which, if proved, would
establish a presumption of constructive possession. First, a defendant
who knew of the presence of the drugs, 8 and who either resided at, 9
exclusively held the keys to,2" or paid the rent for 2 the premises on
which the narcotics were found thereby exercised dominion and con-
trol over those premises, and constructively possessed the drugs
therein. Second, dominion and control over the drugs themselves has
evolved as a means of proving constructive possession when it has been
shown that the defendant's relationship to the narcotics has enabled
him alone to control their disposition. 2 As the court noted in
Callahan:2
8
It follows from a review of our cases on constructive possession
of narcotics and dangerous drugs that in each instance there is
15. In State v. Henker, 50 Wn. 2d 809, 314 P.2d 645 (1957) a cognizant defendant's
conviction for possession of marijuana was upheld because he exerted ownership over a
patch of gladioli among which the marijuana plants were found growing. In State v.
Hall, 41 Wn. 2d 446, 249 P.2d 769 (1952), the "somewhat confused state of the record,"
id. at 451, 249 P.2d at 771, did not prevent the court from affirming the conviction of
an erstwhile horticulturalist who claimed naivet6 with respect to interloping cannibas
americana.
16. State v. Johnson, 129 Wash. 62, 66, 224 P. 602, 603 (1924).
17. See note 4, supra.
18. See note 5 and accompanying text, supra.
19. State v. Chakos, 74 Wn. 2d 154, 443 P.2d 815 (1968).
20. State v. Mantell, 71 Wn. 2d 768, 430 P.2d 980 (1967); State v. Potts, 1 Wn. App.
614, 464 P.2d 742 (1970).
21. State v. Morris, 70 Wn. 2d 27, 422 P.2d 27 (1966).
22. In State v. Mantell, 71 Wn. 2d 768, 430 P.2d 980 (1967), an unwanted guest
who held no leasehold interest in the apartment in which the drugs were discovered,
was found to have exercised dominion and control over both the drugs and the premises.
A better analysis would have been to find that there was dominion and control over
the drugs alone; the defendant owned the narcotics, but the permanent resident of
the premises wanted nothing to do with him or his contraband, and turned him in to
the police.
23. 77 Wash. Dec. 2d at 29, 459 P.2d at 400 (emphasis added). Washington is




evidence that the defendant was in dominion and control of
either the drugs or the premises on which the drugs were found.
In Callahan the defendant had no leasehold interest in the house-
boat, did not live there, and was only one of numerous people who
circulated in and out of the premises. The court therefore concluded
that no inference of dominion and control over the premises could be
drawn.
The court also concluded that the defendant, at the time of his
arrest, was not exercising dominion and control over the drugs them-
selves. Several factors seem to justify this result. The defendant's
"ownership" of the drugs was never established; direct evidence of
ownership in another was admitted;24 and apparently this defendant
had no personal dispositive rights in the narcotics."
State v. Callahan has eliminated much of the "gray area" in the
Washington definition of constructive possession of narcotics and
dangerous drugs. In overturning the defendant's conviction the court
spelled out, for the first time, what is not dominion and control, and
thereby established an opposite pole of reference to that of other
cases.26 Five recent constructive possession cases antedate the decision
of the Washington court in Callahan.-7 By analyzing these five cases
and comparing them with Callahan, it should be possible to determine
the present scope of the "dominion and control" doctrine and to deter-
mine how much "gray area" remains.
24. The court in Callahan was cognizant of the ownership factor. It stated:
Consideration must be given to the ownership of the drugs as ownership can carry
with it the right of dominion and control . . . .Evidence pointing to any dominion
and control the defendant might have over the drugs was purely circumstantial and
it is not within the rule of reasonable hypothesis to hold that proof of possession by
the defendant may be established by circumstantial evidence when undisputed direct
proof places exclusive possession in some other person. See State v. Charley, 48 Wn. 2d
126, 291 P.2d 673 (1955).
77 Wash. Dec. 2d at 30, 459 P.2d at 403.
25. Although it was established that the defendant was seated in close proximity to
"various pills and hypodermic syringes," and that "[a] cigar box filled with various
drugs was on the floor," nowhere in the opinion is there any evidence establishing the
defendant as the probable controller of the drugs. 77 Wash. Dec. 2d at 30, 459 P.2d
at 403.
26. See notes 27-34 and accompanying text, infra.
27. State v. Chak-os, 74 Wn. 2d 156, 443 P.2d 815 (1968); State v. Weiss, 73 Wn. 2d
372, 438 P.2d 610 (1968); State v. Walcott, 72 Wn. 2d 959, 435 P.2d 994 (1967);
State v. Mantell, 71 Wn. 2d 768, 430 P.2d 980 (1967); State v. Morris, 70 Wn. 2d 27,
422 P.2d 27 (1966).
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I. DOMINION AND CONTROL OF PREMISES
Case by case analysis of the decisions preceding Callahan now en-
ables an observer to delineate with some precision the meaning of
dominion and control of premises. In State v. Walcott,2" which first
established the dominion and control test,29 and in State v. Weiss," the
defendants were residents of the premises in a classic, leasehold sense,
and were on the premises when the arrests were made. The defendant
landlady in State v. Chakos3' also had "dominion." Although not re-
siding in the room where the drugs were found, she had unlimited
access to the area, the building's use being communal in nature. And
in State v. Morris,3 2 the defendant's physical residence on the premises
was not established, but his conviction was affirmed because he paid
the rent for the apartment and was shown to have frequented it.
The Callahan fact pattern may be easily distinguished from the
above four cases. Not only was the defendant in Callahan not a resi-
dent, but there was no evidence that he often visited the houseboat, or
that he contributed financially or physically to its maintenance.3
The fifth case, State v. Mantell,34 cannot be so easily distinguished.
There, the defendant was not a resident in any traditional sense, nor is
there any indication that he exerted more control over the premises
than did the defendant in Callahan. Nonetheless, the court found him
to have had dominion and control of the premises.35 Thus, there ap-
pears to be a direct conflict between the two cases, which the Callahan
court either failed to recognize or ignored. Callahan should control
the conflict, however, not only because it is more recent, but also be-
cause the holding as to premises in Callahan was necessary to the
reversal of the conviction. Affirmance of the conviction in Mantell
could have stood independently (i.e. dominion and control of the drugs
28. 72 Wn. 2d 959, 435 P.2d 994 (1967).
29. In Walcott, the defendant contended that the "dwelling was not under his
dominion and control." But the court found that "there was substantial evidence on
the record, which the jury was entitled to believe, that the defendant was in charge of
the entire premises . . . ." 72 Wn. 2d at 966, 435 P.2d at 999-1000.
30. 73 Wn. 2d 372, 438 P.2d 610 (1968).
31. 74 Wn. 2d 154, 443 P.2d 815 (1968).
32. 70 Wn. 2d 27, 422 P.2d 27 (1966).
33. See text accompanying note 1, supra.
34. 71 Wn. 2d 768, 430 P.2d 980 (1967) ; see note 22, supra.
35. Id. at 772, 430 P.2d at 982-83.
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themselves), and Mantell's statement about the premises could be
regarded as dictum.
Callahan appears to have outlined the requirements for dominion
and control over premises as follows: 1) Actual residence on the
premises; 2) Financial (or possibly physical) contribution to the
maintenance of the premises; or 3) some other sort of positive control,
as in Chakos.36 Mere presence or use of premises in conjunction with
others, as in Callahan and Mantell will no longer suffice.
II. DOMINION AND CONTROL OF THE DRUGS
Although the Callahan court drew a definite line on the issue of
dominion and control of premises, much doubt remains concerning the
scope of the holding as to dominion and control of the drugs them-
selves. The case raises two major problems in connection with this
issue. First, the court appears to lean heavily on "ownership" as a
primary indication of dominion and control over the drugs, relying on
admitted ownership by another to exculpate the defendant.37 There-
fore a question is raised as to the reliance which will be put on "owner-
ship" in future cases. It is submitted that while the court will use
ownership (in the sense of legal title) as determinative of the dominion
and control question where conclusive evidence appears, neither the
prosecution nor the defense will be limited to a conclusive showing of
ownership.
Since the dominion and control test adopted in Walcott replaced
earlier tests which did rely in part on ownership,38 any attempt to
36. E.g., in the first decision to apply Callahan, State v. Potts, 1 Wn. App. 614, 464
P.2d 742 (1969), the intermediate appellate court recognized the Callahan admonition,
but upheld a possession conviction. In Potts, ownership of the automobile in which the
marijuana was found was never established. However, the court pointed out:
In State v. Callahan, supra, the court reviewed cases that have involved constructive
possessioh of narcotics and drugs and concluded that in each instance there was
evidence that the defendant had dominion and control of either the drugs or the
premises on which the drugs were found. In the instant case, it is clear that the
defendant had dominion and control over the "premises." He had the keys to the car
and was driving it. He was the sole occupant of the car.
1 Wn. App. at 617, 464 P.2d at 745. In Potts the court specifically pointed to the fact
that the defendant was alone in an automobile in drawing its inference of dominion
and control. Had there been others in the car more evidence would probably have been
required to remain within the Callahan directive. See State v. Cabigas, 3 Wn. App. 740,
477 P.2d 648 (1970).
37. See note 24 and accompanying text, supra.
38. See notes 16-17, and accompanying text, supra.
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create a tautological relationship between "ownership" and "dominion
and control" would destroy any possible reason for having changed
the test. Rather, the court's language makes it clear that evidence of
"ownership" was controlling only because it was direct, while the
conflicting evidence as to dominion and control was circumstantial.a9
While the court did state that ownership was a relevant considera-
tion, 40 thereby explicitly acknowledging a relationship between owner-
ship and dominion and control, the statement simply recognizes that
dominion and control is one aspect of ownership, and is necessarily
encompassed therein. Thus, while proven ownership will satisfy the
dominion and control test, that test may also be satisfied by something
less.
Having determined that proof of "ownership" should not be neces-
sary to show dominion and control of the narcotics, we are faced with
a second major problem: what proof is necessary to show dominion
and control of narcotics? Would the conviction in Callahan have been
reversed even if there had been no admitted ownership by another, or
would the prosecution's evidence have been sufficient standing alone?
While the principal case, by itself, offers no clue, a comparison of
Callahan with the five previous decisions41 may shed some light on the
question.
Walcott, Weiss, and Chakos do not confront the issue at all, since
all three cases stand on the "premises" issue. Mantell dealt with actual
possession of the drugs themselves, and evidence of dominion and
control was unnecessary to sustain the convictions.42
Only the court's statements in Morris remain for consideration. In
that case, the drugs were in a hollowed-out book, and a witness saw the
defendant handle the book on at least four occasions. 43 This evidence
was similar to that in Callahan, where the defendant admitted having
handled the drugs, yet the conviction in Morris was affirmed, while
that in Callahan was reversed.
There appear to be three possible explanations for this apparent
inconsistency. First, it is possible that the court intends to affirm all
39. See note 24, supra.
40. See note 24, supra.
41. See note 27 and accompanying text, supra.
42. 71 Wn. 2d at 771, 430 P.2d at 981.
43. 70 Wn. 2d at 30, 422 P.2d at 29.
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future convictions in which similar evidence of proximity to, and
handling of the drugs indicates dominion and control, and that Cal-
lahan was reversed only because of the direct evidence of ownership in
another. Second, it may be that the court never intended such evidence,
standing alone, to be sufficient for conviction, and that the statement
in Morris that such "possession" of the book was sufficient was mere
dictum, because the conviction in Morris could have stood on the
"premises" ground alone.44 Finally, it is possible that the court has
changed its position on this question without bothering to overrule
Morris, as it seems to have done on the "premises" issue without over-
ruling Mantell.4 5
It is submitted that the final possibility seems to be the most plausi-
ble. First, the court's intention in Callahan seems to be that it will be
less willing in the future to accept evidence of a passive relationship to
the drugs as determinative of dominion and control, and second, the
final possibility appears more desirable from a policy standpoint. It
must be emphasized that Callahan is the first case to reverse a posses-
sion conviction since adoption of the dominion and control test; that
alone should serve as a signal that new guidelines have been adopted.
Further, there is no apparent reason why different criteria should be
assigned to the "premises" issue than those assigned to determination
of dominion and control of the drugs, and, as discussed above, con-
viction on the "premises" issue now seems to require a showing of
positive control by the defendant.48 Moreover, it is clear that the
defendant carries a much heavier burden than usual in a criminal case
once dominion and control is shown4 To require him to carry that
burden without the clearest proof of dominion and control in the first
instance would be grossly unfair.
When the Washington court is faced with future similar cases but
which lack direct evidence of ownership, more "gray area" will be
categorized either as sufficient to convict under the language in Morris,
or as exculpatory under Callahan. A functional relationship concerning
dominion and control of drugs should then emerge, based on the
44. Id. at 29, 422 P.2d at 29.
45. See text accompanying notes 34-36, supra.
46. See note 36 and accompanying text, supra.
47. See notes 5-7 and accompanying text, supra.
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amount of positive conduct displayed by the defendant toward the
drugs and their disposition.
CONCLUSION
The definition of dominion and control described in Callahan, if un-
clear in part, nonetheless is an effective cushion against potential
excesses of the state. With respect to a defendant's relationship to the
premises, Callahan supports the assertion that positive control, not
merely presence, must be shown by the prosecution. With respect to
the defendant's contact with the drugs themselves, two clarifications
seem to emerge from Callahan. First, there is the reassertion of the
principle that dominion and control cannot be proven by circumstan-
tial evidence when there is admitted ownership by another.4" Second,
"control" is shown to be an individual control which again should be
positive and not merely presumptive.
The Callahan decision is to be applauded both because it inhibits
the state's use of a legal fiction to lighten its burden of proof in
narcotics possession cases and because it refuses to punish an indi-
vidual for what may have been only an unfortunate choice of asso-
ciates.
48. See State v. Charley, 48 Wn. 2d 126, 291 P.2d 673 (1955) ; see also note 24, supra.
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